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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. medical device market is the largest in the
world.1 It has been estimated at $105.8 billion in 2011, and
seven of the world’s ten largest device manufacturers are U.S.
companies.2 However, the industry is in the midst of major
change. In 2009, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
launched a comprehensive review of one of its major pathways
for devices to enter the market—the 510(k) clearance process.3
As part of this review, the FDA assembled a number of internal
working groups, held public meetings, and commissioned the
Institute of Medicine (IOM) to assemble a committee to conduct
its own independent evaluation of the 510(k) system.4 In early
2011, the FDA released its recommendations for approximately
twenty-five changes it plans to implement.5 There were seven
additional issues, however, that the FDA recognized as being
especially problematic.6 The FDA deferred taking actions on
these particular issues, instead referring them to the IOM
committee for evaluation.7
The IOM is the “health arm of the National Academy of
Sciences,” which together with the National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council form the National

1. EPSICOM HEALTHCARE INTELLIGENCE, THE MEDICAL DEVICE MARKET:
USA (2011), available at http://www.marketresearch.com/product/display
.asp?productid=6134830&SID=60434945-509248120-499165305&curr=USD.
2. Id.
3. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT
RECOMMENDATIONS: SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF COMMENTS AND NEXT
STEPS 1 (2011) [hereinafter FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT
RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM239449.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PLAN OF ACTION FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF 510(K) AND SCIENCE RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2011) [hereinafter FDA, PLAN OF ACTION], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM239450.pdf.
6. FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3,
at 2.
7. Id.
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Academies.8 Its mission is to serve as an advisor to the federal
government.9 As such, it is heavily involved in policy analysis
and recommendations. In fact, most of its work comes from
Congress or federal agencies.10 The IOM’s reputation for distinguished experts, robust analyses, and fair processes lead to its
recommendations being heavily relied upon by government officials and other stakeholders.11 Thus, the IOM is highly influential in shaping public policy.
The IOM’s powerful status creates a responsibility to ensure that its processes are fair, objective, and inclusive. Unlike
traditional federal advisory committees, IOM committees that
advise federal agencies are subject to few legal requirements.12
For example, they do not have to publish notice of meetings in
the Federal Register, may deliberate in private, do not require
monitoring by federal officials, and do not need to release for
public comment their recommendations before issuing them in
final form.13 Additionally, the IOM alone determines who is appointed to each committee.14 However, like advisory committees, IOM committees are required to be “fairly balanced . . . for
the functions to be performed.”15A committee that is not fairly
balanced lacks the essential expertise and perspectives to adequately fulfill its functions. Such a committee’s recommendations may thus be incomplete or ill-informed. Additionally, the
committee risks actual or perceived bias, threatening stakeholder acceptance of its recommendations. To avoid relying on

8. About the IOM, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last
visited Oct. 29, 2011).
9. See COMM. ON THE PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K)
CLEARANCE PROCESS, PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K)
CLEARANCE PROCESS iv (Theresa Wizemann ed. 2010) [hereinafter PUBLIC
HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS], available
at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12960&page=R1 (“The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences
by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government . . . .”).
10. See About the IOM, supra note 8.
11. Cf. id. (discussing the IOM’s stellar reputation and work with Congress and federal agencies).
12. Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 5–14
(2006) (governing federal advisory committees). IOM committees are only governed by FACA section 15. Id. § 15.
13. Compare 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 5–14 (statutory requirements for federal
advisory committees), with id. § 15 (requirements for NAS committees).
14. Id. § 15(b)(1).
15. Id.
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such an unbalanced committee, federal law prohibits the FDA
from using any report issued by a committee that lacks fair
balance.16
This Article17 contends that, while the IOM is generally an
invaluable policy resource, its Committee on the Public Health
Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process (510(k)
Committee)18 is not fairly balanced. The committee’s primary
function is to evaluate the 510(k) system’s effect on patient
safety and innovation,19 but the committee lacks patients, patient advocates, inventors and innovators who are familiar with
the 510(k) system, product developers, entrepreneurs, financiers, manufacturers, and medical device industry professionals.
These critical omissions in 510(k) Committee membership render the committee unbalanced and thus unable to fairly and accurately perform its duties. Additionally, the committee does
not contain a balance of perspectives, subjecting it to possible
bias, or at least the appearance of bias. For these reasons, the
FDA is legally prohibited from using “any advice or recommendation provided by” the 510(k) Committee.20 Furthermore, by
releasing its report before these issues could be resolved, IOM
has risked damaging its well-deserved reputation for quality
and objectivity.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the
FDA’s 510(k) clearance process and discusses some of the controversy regarding the adequacy of that process. Part II reviews
the federal law that applies to advisory committees generally
as well as the specific provisions that pertain to IOM committees. This Part also discusses the requirement that IOM committees be “fairly balanced” and suggests how courts might interpret that requirement. Part III presents the National
Academies’ policies regarding committee member selection and
committee operation. It focuses on the Academies’ policies re-

16. Id. § 15(a).
17. This Article is an expansion of an earlier piece on this subject by the
authors. See Ralph F. Hall & Eva Stensvad, Recent Development, A Failure to
Comply: An Initial Assessment of Gaps in IOM’s Medical Device Study Committee, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 731 (2011).
18. Activity: Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/Activities/PublicHealth/510KProcess
.aspx (last visited Oct. 30 , 2011).
19. Id.
20. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(a).
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garding balance, bias, and conflicts of interest. Part IV closely
examines the 510(k) Committee’s purpose and composition,
concluding that the committee lacks the balance of expertise
and perspectives necessary to fulfill its function. Finally, Part V
addresses other policy considerations that dictate a balanced
committee. The Article concludes that given the 510(k) Committee’s composition, the FDA is statutorily barred from using
the committee’s report. Further, IOM should not have released
its report before these serious issues could be resolved.
The issue presented by this Article is a matter of fair process—the final report’s recommendations and the authors’ opinions regarding those recommendations are irrelevant.21 If federal agencies intend to rely on IOM committees when making
major policy and regulatory decisions, those IOM committees
must follow good processes and contain fair balance. At the
very least, they must comply with the few statutory requirements that apply to them.
II. FDA’S 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS FOR MEDICAL
DEVICES
The FDA is an agency within the Department of Health
and Human Services.22 It has two primary functions with respect to medical devices. First, it is “responsible for protecting
the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy, and security
of . . . medical devices.”23 Second, it is “responsible for advancing the public health by helping to speed innovations.”24 Given
the inherent tension between thoroughly ensuring that devices
are safe and effective and optimally promoting innovation, the
FDA attempts to balance these goals through its device approval and clearance mechanisms. In particular, the 510(k)

21. At the time this Article was drafted, IOM recommendations had not
yet been released to the public. The 510(k) Committee Report was released in
the summer of 2011, despite the defects in the committee’s membership. See
COMM. ON THE PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 510(K) CLEARANCE
PROCESS, INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE
FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS (2011) [hereinafter MEDICAL
DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH], available at http://www.nap.edu/cata
log.php?record_id=13150.
22. FDA
Fundamentals,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/transparency/basics/ucm192695.htm (last visited
Oct. 30, 2011).
23. What We Do, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/default.htm (last updated Nov. 18, 2010).
24. Id.
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process aims to make safe and effective devices available to
consumers more quickly and less expensively,25 thus promoting
innovation in the device industry.26
Before a manufacturer can market a medical device in the
United States, the medical device is first classified into “one of
three regulatory classes based on the level of [regulatory] control necessary to assure the safety and effectiveness of the device.”27 Device classification is essentially risk-based, with
Class I devices being the lowest risk and Class III being the
highest.28 For non-exempt devices,29 manufacturers must obtain FDA approval or clearance through one of two main pathways.30 The first pathway, for higher-risk or Class III devices,31
25. See infra notes 47–49.
26. PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE
PROCESS, supra note 9, at 1−2.
27. Device Classification, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice
(last updated Apr. 27, 2009).
28. Id.
29. Most low-risk medical devices, such as crutches, heating pads, thermometers, tongue depressors, and bandages, are specifically exempt from any
premarket notification or review. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 862–92 (2011). This exemption includes almost all Class I devices and some Class II devices. Medical Device Exemptions 510(k) and GMP Requirements, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpcd/315.cfm (last visited
Oct. 30, 2011). Class I devices are those low-risk devices for which general controls (such as good manufacturing practices) are sufficient to ensure safety
and effectiveness. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1). Class II devices are moderate-risk
devices for which both general and special controls (such as postmarket surveillance, patient registries, or specific FDA guidance) are required. 21 C.F.R.
§ 860.3(c)(2).
30. Investigational Device Exemptions (IDE) “allow[] . . . investigational
device[s] to be used in a clinical study to collect the safety and effectiveness
data required for a Premarket Approval (PMA)” or 510(k) submission. Overview of Medical Devices and Their Regulatory Pathways, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHTrans
parency/ucm203018.htm (last updated May 19, 2010) [hereinafter FDA, Overview of Medical Devices]. There is also the Humanitarian Device Exemption
(HDE) for situations involving less than 4000 products, which will not be discussed here. Id.
31. “Class III devices are those that support or sustain human life, are of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, or which
present a potential, unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices
/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissi
ons/PremarketApprovalPMA/default.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2010) [hereinafter FDA, Premarket Approval (PMA)]; see also 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(3) (2011)
(giving the regulatory definition of a Class III device). Classification regula-
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is Premarket Approval (PMA).32 This is the most stringent type
of device application process required by the FDA, requiring extensive scientific and regulatory review to ensure the device’s
safety and effectiveness prior to marketing.33 Although FDA
regulations provide 180 days to review the PMA and make a
determination, actual review usually takes a lot longer.34 Approval is based on the strength of the scientific and clinical data as well as inspections of the manufacturing facility, processes, and regulatory compliance.35
The second pathway to market is the 510(k) clearance process, or premarket notification, pursuant to section 510(k) of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.36 This process can be used
for moderate-risk devices (generally Class II devices) that do
not require a PMA and for which a “predicate” device exists.37
It can also be used when a manufacturer seeks a new indication or “intended use” for an already-marketed device or when
the manufacturer has changed the design or characteristics of a
device such that it might affect its performance, safety, or effectiveness.38 The manufacturer must submit a 510(k), which is a
premarket submission made to the FDA, to demonstrate that
tions can be found at 21 C.F.R. §§ 868–92. Examples of Class III devices include heart valves, defibrillators, and various implantable materials such as
prostheses, cochlear implants, and breast implants. See FDA, Overview of
Medical Devices, supra note 30.
32. FDA, Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 31; 21 U.S.C. § 360e
(2006).
33. FDA, Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. MICHELE SCHOONMAKER, THE U.S. APPROVAL PROCESS FOR MEDICAL
DEVICES: LEGISLATIVE ISSUES AND COMPARISON WITH THE DRUG MODEL 16
(2005).
36. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2006).
37. FDA, Overview of Medical Devices, supra note 30. Examples of Class
II devices include infusion pumps, blood pressure cuffs, ventilators, x-ray systems, and various surgical materials. See id. Where a predicate device does
not exist, applicants may use the “de novo” process to seek reclassification
based upon a risk assessment of the product, possibly enabling them to utilize
the 510(k) system rather than the default PMA pathway. See 21 U.S.C. §
360c(f)(2) (2006); see also Special Considerations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMar
ketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/ucm134578
.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2010).
38. Premarket Notification (510k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMar
ketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/default.ht
m (last updated Sept. 3, 2010) [hereinafter FDA, Premarket Notification
(510k)].
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the device to be marketed is at least as safe and effective as
(i.e., substantially equivalent to) a legally marketed device, or
“predicate” device.39 A predicate device is one “that was legally
marketed prior to May 28, 1976” for which a PMA is not required, “a device which has been reclassified from [C]lass III to
[C]lass II or I . . . , or a device which has been found to be substantially equivalent through the 510(k) premarket notification
process.”40 Once the manufacturer makes its 510(k) submission,
the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) within
the FDA has ninety days to determine whether the device is, in
fact, substantially equivalent.41 Once the FDA declares a device
substantially equivalent, the manufacturer may immediately
market the device.42
Compared to the PMA process, the 510(k) process is different in three key ways. First, it is generally less stringent—
PMAs require scientific and clinical studies and a more thorough FDA review including inspection of manufacturing facilities, whereas substantial equivalence for 510(k)s is usually
based on device descriptions and technical data.43 Second, it is
usually much faster—the FDA generally makes 510(k) decisions more quickly than it does PMA decisions.44 Third, 510(k)s
are significantly less expensive than PMAs.45 For example, in
fiscal year 2012, the standard fee for a PMA was $220,050.46 In
contrast, the standard 510(k) fee was only $4049.47 For these
39. Id. A finding of substantial equivalence does not mean that the devices are identical—it means that when looking at the intended use of the device
and its technological characteristics, there are no new questions raised as to
the device’s safety and effectiveness. Id.
40. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(a)(3) (2011).
41. FDA, Premarket Notification (510k), supra note 38. Alternatively, the
FDA can “find the device not substantially equivalent (NSE) . . . , or request
additional information” giving the manufacturer an additional thirty days.
SCHOONMAKER, supra note 35, at 14.
42. FDA, Premarket Notification (510k), supra note 38.
43. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-190, MEDICAL DEVICES:
FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE
APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS 14–
15 (2009).
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id.
46. PMA Review Fees, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Med
icalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/Premar
ketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/ucm048161.htm (last updated Sept.
13, 2011).
47. Premarket Notification [510(k)] Review Fees, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
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reasons—and because most new medical devices are similar to
products already on the market, do not present any new safety
or technical questions, and do not represent a significant health
risk48—the 510(k) process is heavily utilized by the medical device industry. In 2009, the FDA received 3597 510(k)s, only 20
original PMAs, and 1394 PMA supplements.49 In 2010, 2766
medical devices were cleared through the 510(k) process.50 Between January and September 2011, 2281 devices had been
cleared.51
Despite the advantages of the 510(k) process, it has recently come under attack. Stakeholders on both sides have criticized the process as inadequately protecting public health—
either by insufficiently ensuring patient safety or by unnecessarily hindering innovation.52 For example, Public Citizen, a
national nonprofit organization, fervently argues that the
510(k) process clears devices too easily and “has failed to keep
dangerous and ineffective medical devices from the market.”53
Supporting this assertion, a Government Accountability Office
(GAO) study found that between 2003 and 2007, the FDA reviewed 13,199 510(k) submissions for Class I and II devices and
cleared ninety percent for marketing.54 It also found that the
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMar
ketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/ucm134566
.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2011).
48. OCD FY2006: FDA Goal 2—Increasing Access to Innovative Products
and Technologies to Improve Health, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports/ucm12930
1.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2010).
49. OFFICE OF DEVICE EVALUATION, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2009 4−5 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM223893.pdf.
50. See Devices Cleared in 2010, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApp
rovalsandClearances/510kClearances/ucm199998.htm (last updated Jan. 6,
2011) (totaling the number of 510(k) clearances for all of 2010).
51. See Devices Cleared in 2011, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApp
rovalsandClearances/510kClearances/ucm242632.htm (last updated Oct. 5,
2011) (totaling the number of 510(k) clearances between January and September).
52. FDA 510(K) AND THE PUB. HEALTH, supra note 9, at 15–16; MEDICAL
DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 4.
53. Comments on FDA 510(k) Medical Devices Working Group Preliminary
CITIZEN
(Oct.
4,
2010),
Report
and
Recommendations,
PUB.
http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=4535.
54. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 43, at 6. This study
did not look at all 510(k) submissions—for specific study methodology, see id.
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FDA reviewed 342 submissions for Class III devices and
cleared sixty-seven percent for marketing.55 In 2010, seventythree percent of 510(k) submissions resulted in a substantially
equivalent determination, and in the first eight months of 2011,
that number rose again to seventy-seven percent.56
Conversely, other groups argue that the 510(k) process is
so burdensome, unpredictable, and inconsistent that it actually
inhibits innovation.57 A survey of over two hundred medical
technology companies found that the inefficient, prolonged
premarket regulatory process resulted in devices being available in the United States a full two years later than in other
countries, having a significant effect on patient health in the
United States.58 As a result of the perceived flaws of the regulatory system, “[f]ewer medical device start-ups are being
launched in the U.S. . . . [a]nd innovators . . . are relocating to
other countries.”59 In addition, although the FDA clears a significant percentage of devices, at least one analysis has shown
that the vast majority of 510(k) clearances do not result in a
Class I safety recall60 over a five-year period.61
at 30.
55. Id. at 6.
56. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INITIAL RESULTS OF 510(K) AUDIT:
ANALYSIS OF NOT SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT (NSE) DETERMINATIONS 2
(2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/
CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM259187.pdf.
57. See, e.g., JOSH MAKOWER ET AL., FDA IMPACT ON U.S. MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 6–7 (2010) (surveying over two hundred medical
technology companies and finding that most respondents found the regulatory
process to be unpredictable, prolonged, inefficient, and expensive).
58. Id. at 7. “Under current FDA processes, millions of U.S. patients are
being denied or delayed access to leading medical devices that are first (or exclusively) brought to market in other countries.” Id. at 8.
59. Id. at 8.
60. Class I recalls are the most serious recalls, in which “there is a reasonable probability that the use of . . . a violative product will cause serious
adverse health consequences or death.” Background and Definitions, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/ucm165546.htm (last
updated June 24, 2009).
61. Ralph F. Hall, Univ. of Minn., Using Recall Data to Assess the 510(k)
Process (July 28, 2010), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/
Files/Activity%20Files/PublicHealth/510kProcess/2010-JUL-28/06%20Hall.
pdf. This study found that 99.55% of all devices cleared through the 510(k)
process over a five-year period did not result in a Class I recall for any reason,
and 99.78% the devices did not experience Class I safety recalls related to any
premarket issue. Id. In sum, only 0.22% of cleared devices resulted in a recall
related to premarket issues. Id.
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Because of the widespread criticism of the premarket regulatory process, the FDA launched a review of the 510(k) system.
In September 2009, the FDA established two staff committees—the 510(k) Working Group and the Task Force on the Utilization of Science in Regulatory Decision Making—to review
and address concerns regarding the 510(k) program.62 In August 2010, the two internal working groups issued fifty-five
recommendations, and after reviewing public comments, the
FDA announced in January 2011 the twenty-five actions it
plans to take to improve the 510(k) program.63
In addition to its internal working groups, the FDA also
commissioned the IOM to conduct a detailed external review of
the system.64 This IOM committee was formed in early 2010
and held three public meetings in March, June, and July
2010.65 In the FDA’s January 2011 work plan, it specifically referred seven important questions to this IOM committee.66
However, the 510(k) Committee held no public meetings after
the FDA referred these questions to it.67 The IOM committee
completed its analysis and conducted a peer review process
that did not include any public discussion of proposed recommendations. 68 The committee then released its report on July
29, 2011.69

62. JEFFREY SHUREN, CDRH PRELIMINARY INTERNAL EVALUATIONS:
FOREWORD: A MESSAGE FROM THE CENTER DIRECTOR 1 (2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports
/UCM220782.pdf.
63. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA to Improve Most Common
Review Path for Medical Devices (Jan. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm240418.
htm.
64. See FDA 510(K) AND THE PUB. HEALTH, supra note 9, at 1.
65. MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 19;
MED.,
http://www.iom.edu/Global/Meetings.aspx?activ
Meetings,
INST.
ity={F0FB3742-55FD-4398-A383-DB71604B2FC7} (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
66. FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3,
at 2.
67. See MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 19
(indicating that the last public meeting was held in July 2010).
68. Drafts of IOM reports remain confidential until after the report is independently reviewed. See NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS: ENSURING
INDEPENDENT, OBJECTIVE ADVICE (n.d.) [hereinafter NAT’L ACADS., OUR
STUDY
PROCESS],
available
at
http://www.nationalacademies.org
/studycommitteprocess.pdf. Only after all committee members and appropriate
officials sign off on the final report is the report released to the public. Id.
69. Press Release, Nat’l Acads., FDA Should Invest in Developing a New
Regulatory Framework to Replace Flawed 510(k) Medical Device Clearance

3 STENSVAD HALL FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

86

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/27/2012 12:48 PM

[Vol. 13:1

III. THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT
IOM committees do not operate in a legal vacuum—they
are governed by section 15 of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA).70 This next section discusses FACA’s history and
application to IOM committees. It then examines the requirements imposed by section 15 on IOM committees. Finally, it
discusses whether judicial review of IOM committees is possible and, if so, what such review might entail.
A. FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT AND AMENDMENTS
FACA was originally enacted in 1972 in order to address
concerns that advisory committees71 were disorganized, duplicative, not properly overseen, and lacking in public involvement.72 The purpose of the Act is “to reduce wasteful expenditure on advisory committees and to make advisory committees
established by the executive branch of government more accountable to the public”73 by “provid[ing] standards for the es-

Process (July 29, 2011), available at http://www8.nationalacademies.org/
onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=13150.
70. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15 (2006).
71. Advisory committees are generally “entities created to provide the
Government with expert advice and collective recommendations from the private sector.” Virginia A. McMurtry, Introduction and Legislative History of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (Public Law 92-463), in VIRGINIA A.
MCMURTRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95TH CONG., FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ACT (PUBLIC LAW 92-463): SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3 (Comm. Print 1978). FACA defines “advisory committees” as
any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task
force, or other similar group . . . which is . . . (a) established by statute
or reorganization plan, or (b) established or utilized by the President,
or (c) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of
obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more
agencies or officers of the Federal Government.
5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 3(2) (2006). The current definition specifically excludes any
committee created by the National Academy of Sciences. Id.
72. See generally Kurtis A. Kemper, Construction and Application of Federal Advisory Committee Act, 160 A.L.R. FED. 483 (2000) (discussing the enactment of FACA).
73. Id. at 483; see also Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972). FACA’s purpose was “to control the advisory committee process and to open to public scrutiny the manner in which government
agencies obtain advice from private individuals.” Food Chem. News, Inc. v.
Davis, 378 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (D.D.C. 1974); see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 459 (1989) (“FACA’s principal purpose was to
enhance the public accountability of advisory committees . . . .”).
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tablishment, operation, termination, and control of advisory
committees.”74 It imposed a number of requirements on advisory committees including fair balance on committees, filing of
committee charters, notice and publication of meetings in the
Federal Register, public access to meetings and records, monitoring of meetings by federal officials, and limited committee
duration.75 It also provided for Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) oversight.76
FACA applies to advisory committees that are “established” or “utilized” by federal agencies.77 As originally enacted,
FACA was not intended to apply to committees formed by the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS),78 of which the IOM is a
part.79 NAS is a private, independent organization of scientists
and academics, chartered by Congress in 1863 to “investigate,
examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science.”80
Its original purpose was to provide the government with independent advice on scientific matters.81 It “consists of members
elected by peers in recognition of distinguished achievement in
their respective fields.”82 NAS has about 2100 members, and
the IOM has about 1600 members.83 While the NAS and IOM
are technically independent and do not receive “direct appropriations from the federal government, . . . many of [their] activities are mandated and funded by Congress and federal
74. Exec. Order No. 11,686, 37 Fed. Reg. 21,421 (Oct. 7, 1972).
75. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 5–14 (2006); see also S. Rep. No. 92-1098 (1972).
76. S. Rep. No. 92-1098. OMB’s oversight was later transferred to the
General Services Administration. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 12.
77. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 3(2).
78. “The concept of extending FACA to privately managed and controlled
organizations outside the Federal government such as the National Academy
of Sciences was discussed and rejected when the FACA legislation was adopted by the House of Representatives.” 143 CONG. REC. 25,844 (1997) (citing 118
CONG. REC. 31,421 (1972)).
79. NAS established the IOM in 1970. History of the National Academies,
NAT’L ACADS., http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/history.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). Over the years, NAS has evolved to incorporate not only
IOM, but also the National Academy of Engineering and the National Research Council. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS 2
(2005), available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/nrc/CommitteePro
cess.pdf. Together, these organizations are collectively known as the National
Academies. Id.
80. Who We Are, NAT’L ACADS., http://www.nationalacademies.org/
about/whoweare.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
81. Id.
82. History of the National Academies, supra note 79.
83. Id.
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agencies.”84 In fact, approximately ninety percent of NAS reports are requested by government agencies or legislative
committees of Congress.85 The NAS and IOM are highly influential organizations due to the wealth of expertise among their
membership, the high quality of their work, and their wellearned “solid reputation[s] as the nation’s premier source of independent, expert advice on scientific, engineering, and medical issues.”86
For twenty-five years, FACA was not applied to NAS—it
was only applied to committees “subject to actual management
and control by a Federal agency.”87 However, in 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Shalala88 held that FACA
should apply to committees formed by NAS because NAS is a
“quasi-public” organization that receives public funds, was
formed by the government, and generally operates for the government’s benefit.89 The court found the NAS committee was
“utilized” by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and thus subject to FACA’s many requirements.90
Congress became concerned that the District Court’s decision could “impose significant burdens on the Federal government”91 and interfere with the independence and quality of
NAS studies. In response, Congress passed the Federal Adviso-

84. Who We Are, supra note 80.
85. 143 CONG. REC. 25,844 (1997) (statement of Rep. Stephen Horn).
“Federal agencies are the primary financial sponsors of the Academies’ work.”
NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS, supra note 68.
86. Our Reputation, NAT’L ACADS., http://www.nationalacademies.org/
about/reputation.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). NAS has an entire webpage
of quotes extolling the prestige, reputation, credibility, and influence of the
NAS. Id.
87. 143 CONG. REC. 25,844. Analysis of cases prior to 1997 is irrelevant
when analyzing current FACA requirements for NAS committees because of
the specific FACA amendment concerning NAS in 1997. See Federal Advisory
Committee Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-153, 111 Stat. 2689.
88. 114 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
89. Id. at 1209–10; see also Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Shalala, 104
F.3d 424, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
90. 114 F.3d at 1209–10.
91. 143 CONG. REC. 25,844. It would have nearly “double[d] the number of
discretionary committees subject to the FACA chartering requirements, almost double[d] the number of discretionary committees that must be monitored by Federal officials, and significantly increase[d] the administrative
burdens on OMB and GSA in overseeing FACA committees.” Id.
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ry Committee Act Amendments of 1997,92 including the nownumbered section 15, in order to “clarify public disclosure requirements that are applicable to the National Academy of Sciences.”93 The purpose of the amendments was twofold. First,
the amendments sought to make it clear that the “academy
should not be subject to the full process of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act.”94 Congress considered the Academies “valuable to America precisely because they are independent of agency influence” and because they include the “best professionals
and experts” and “derive their recommendations from multiple
perspectives.”95 FACA imposed rigorous procedural requirements which could potentially affect NAS’s independence.96 For
those reasons, Congress wanted to ensure NAS’s independence
from the government to “preserve their high quality, objective,
independent studies.”97
Second, the amendments “require[d] more openness when
Federal agencies utilize the academies.”98 Congress recognized
that NAS often provided the government with advice and needed to balance NAS’s “need for independence with the public’s
right to know about the advisors and procedures used to produce technical or policy advice for the government.”99 These
openness and accountability requirements included that NAS
“[p]ost for public comment the names, biographies, and conflict
of interest disclosures when committee members are nominated.”100 It also required open data-gathering meetings, posting
for public comment the names of reviewers of draft committee
reports, and making summaries available to the public of any
closed committee meetings.101 Importantly, the amendments
required that NAS committee membership be fairly balanced
“for the functions to be performed.”102

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

111 Stat. 2689.
143 CONG. REC. 25,842 (1997) (statement of Rep. Stephen Horn).
Id. at 25,843.
Id. at 25,845.
Id. (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
Id.
Id. at 25,843 (statement of Rep. Stephen Horn).
Id. at 25,845 (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
Id. (statement of Rep. Stephen Horn).
Id.
5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1) (2006).

3 STENSVAD HALL FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

90

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/27/2012 12:48 PM

[Vol. 13:1

B. NAS “FAIR BALANCE” REQUIREMENTS UNDER FACA SECTION
15
Section 15 was intended to make NAS committees more
open and accountable, without sacrificing their independence
and objectivity.103 Among the other requirements previously
discussed, section 15 provides that “[NAS] shall make its best
efforts to ensure that . . . the committee membership is fairly
balanced as determined by the Academy to be appropriate for
the functions to be performed.”104 This “fair balance” requirement serves two important purposes. First, it ensures that the
committees upon which federal agencies rely are objective and
unbiased. Second, it guarantees that these committees include
the variety of perspectives and expertise necessary to fulfill the
committees’ functions. If a committee lacks balance, it may be
inadequate to competently accomplish its task. Even if the
range of expertise is adequate, the committee’s work and agency’s reliance on it may still be perceived as biased.
Additionally, individuals with conflicts of interest should
not serve on the committee unless the conflict is “unavoidable”
and “is promptly and publicly disclosed.”105 The statute itself
does not define when a conflict of interest is “unavoidable,” and
there is no useful discussion of this issue contained in the legislative history. A plain reading of the statute as well as the
IOM’s practices in past committees106 indicate that this is not a
statutory bar against including members with conflicts of interest, but merely discouragement of such practice unless the
individuals are needed to provide a necessary perspective or
area of expertise. The NAS and IOM have definitions and policies of their own regarding such conflicts, which will be discussed later in this Article.
Section 15 sets forth this “fair balance” requirement as a

103. Section 15 applies to “the National Academy of Sciences as a corporation, and therefore to the National Academies as a whole, including the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, and the National
Research Council.” NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION AND
BALANCE AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR COMMITTEES USED IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF REPORTS 2 (2003) [hereinafter NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON
COMMITTEE COMPOSITION], available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/
coi/bi-coi_form-0.pdf.
104. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15 (b)(1).
105. Id.
106. See infra notes 191–210 and accompanying text.
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separate, additional requirement from public notice of meetings,107 open data-gathering meetings,108 public accessibility to
materials,109 public availability of final reports,110 and public
availability of reviewers’ names.111 Therefore, while public input and access to other parts of the committee’s work and datagathering are valuable, these other mechanisms for public participation cannot compensate for a committee’s failure to meet
the fair balance requirement. Importantly, the statute specifically requires fair balance among the committee membership, so
fair balance during the peer review process alone also fails to
satisfy FACA section 15. The NAS committee itself must have
fair balance, regardless of how much public input and balance
is present throughout the rest of the process.
Importantly, if a NAS committee fails to comply with the
statute—for example, by not being fairly balanced—then “[a]n
agency may not use any advice or recommendation” provided
by that committee.112 Therefore, while NAS is free to include
whomever it wants on its committees, if that committee composition does not comply with FACA requirements, then the FDA,
a federal agency, is legally prohibited from using that committee’s work.
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMMITTEE BALANCE113
FACA section 15 grants the IOM a great deal of discretion
in committee membership—for example, the IOM has almost
complete discretion as to which specific individuals it appoints
to serve on its committees.114 Additionally, the IOM can determine when a conflict of interest is unavoidable.115 However, the
IOM’s discretion is not absolute. The statute dictates the committee membership be fairly balanced for its given functions—
107. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(2).
108. Id. § 15(b)(3).
109. Id. § 15(b)(3), (4).
110. Id. § 15(b)(5).
111. Id. § 15(b)(6).
112. Id. § 15(a).
113. There are a number of avenues through which committee composition
may be reviewed and challenged, and judicial review is just one option. For
example, any person can submit a Citizen Petition, requesting the FDA to refrain from taking any administrative action. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2010). The
different mechanisms of challenging agency regulations are beyond the scope
of this Article.
114. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1).
115. Id.

3 STENSVAD HALL FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

92

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/27/2012 12:48 PM

[Vol. 13:1

the IOM may only decide how to achieve this balance, not
whether to achieve this balance.116 While balance need not be
perfect, the IOM must make its “best efforts” to ensure that
such balance on the committee is present. Thus, while the IOM
has discretion as to how to achieve fair balance, an utter failure
to comply, or even attempt to comply, with this statute could
result in judicial review of the FDA’s use of an IOM committee’s advice.
There is currently no existing case law in which an IOM
committee’s composition was challenged under FACA section
15. However, case law under section 5 of FACA may provide
useful guidance as to when and how a court might evaluate
such a challenge. Section 5 deals with official federal advisory
committees (not IOM committees), but it contains similar language to section 15. Section 5 requires that “the membership of
the advisory committee . . . be fairly balanced in terms of the . .
. functions to be performed.”117 Courts examining section 5 have
concluded that this “‘fairly balanced’ requirement was designed
to ensure that persons or groups directly affected by the work
of a particular advisory committee would have some representation on the committee.”118 Furthermore, “[u]nder FACA,
116. While the statute says that fair balance must be “determined by the
Academy,” id., this phrase cannot be read so as to confer upon NAS unfettered
discretion by removing a court’s authority to review statutory compliance.
Otherwise, NAS could theoretically appoint anyone to a committee—for example, it could select a committee comprised entirely of industry representatives—and sprinkle the magic words “fairly balanced” over it. Without any
possibility of reviewing NAS’s fair balance determination, there would be no
means to challenge NAS or any federal agency using the NAS committee under this statute. Such a reading would render the entire statutory provision
meaningless. It is well accepted that statutes should be read as to “give effect,
if possible, to every clause and word . . . .” Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883). Furthermore, there is a “strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.” Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986); see also McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr.,
498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991) (“[I]t is most unlikely that Congress intended to foreclose all forms of meaningful judicial review . . . .”). The Administrative Procedure Act, which governs the FDA, provides that “final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review.” 5
U.S.C. § 704 (2006). Therefore, there must be some form of meaningful judicial
review of FDA’s compliance with this statute—which entails some evaluation
of NAS’s determinations of fair balance. NAS’s discretion cannot be entirely
beyond review.
117. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2) (2006).
118. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing
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agencies should not be permitted to assign advisory committees
functions that the committee members do not have the expertise to perform.”119
This section 5 language is strikingly similar to the fair balance requirement in section 15, and it may be fair to presume
that Congress intended the same meaning and application of
this phrase within the statute when it enacted section 15.120
Section 5 also requires fair balance with respect to points-ofview represented on the committee.121 While section 15 does
not explicitly require point-of-view balance, such balance may
nevertheless be necessary for an IOM committee to adequately
fulfill its function—a biased IOM committee may be unable to
competently address the issues with which it has been
tasked.122 Therefore, committee members’ points-of-view must
be considered when evaluating whether the committee is fairly
balanced to perform its functions.
Courts reviewing committees’ compliance with section 5’s
fair balance requirement123 are generally deferential to agencies’ determinations that a committee is fairly balanced to per-

S. REP. NO. 92-1098 (1972) and H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017 (1972)). The Senate Report states that section 5 “require[s] that membership of the advisory committee shall be representative of those who have a direct interest in the purpose of
such committee.” S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 9.
119. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 336 (5th Cir. 1999).
120. A well-established canon of statutory construction provides that “[a]
term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same
way each time it appears.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994).
121. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2).
122. Indeed, Congress explicitly contemplated this balance of “multiple
perspectives” when enacting the 1997 FACA amendments. See supra note 95
and accompanying text.
123. Some courts have found this to be a nonjusticiable, political question.
See, e.g., Ctr. for Policy Analysis on Trade & Health (CPATH) v. Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, 540 F.3d 940, 945–47 (9th Cir. 2008); Sanchez v.
Pena, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1238 (D.N.M. 1998). However, most courts have
held it to be justiciable. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323,
334–36 (5th Cir. 1999); Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 886 F.2d 419, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, No. C99-1165R, 1999 WL 33526001, at *3–4 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 9, 1999). Additionally, litigants often encounter problems with fulfilling the standing requirements. See, e.g., Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal., 711 F.2d
at 1073–74 (stating that “[t]he standing question is a close one,” but ultimately agreeing that the litigants had standing); Metcalf v. Nat’l Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (denying standing); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance,
1999 WL 33526001, at *2–3 (finding that litigants had standing).
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form its functions.124 However, on occasion, courts have been
willing to find that the committees are not fairly balanced and
have enjoined the use of such committees.125 The examination
has two prongs: First, what is the committee’s function?126 Second, is additional balance needed to fulfill those functions?
Where the functions to be performed are “narrow and explicit,”127 less representation on the committee may be required. For example, in Cargill, Inc. v. United States, the committee’s function was to peer-review a scientific study protocol
for examining the health effects of diesel exhaust exposure on
underground miners.128 Because the committee only needed
“expertise in the scientific method” in order to fulfill its functions, it was sufficient that the committee contained only scientists and statisticians and not individuals with an “in-depth
knowledge of diesel processes.”129 Furthermore, because the
committee’s task of “providing scientific peer review” was “politically neutral and technocratic,” the court found that there was
no need for mine managers to be represented on the committee.130 The committee was not called upon to make policy decisions or provide regulatory advice, so broader representation
was unnecessary.131
Similarly, in Public Citizen v. National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods,132 the committee at
issue was tasked with providing “advice and recommendations
on the development of microbiological criteria for foods.”133 Public Citizen, moving for a preliminary injunction, argued that
there was no fair balance because there were many food indus124. See, e.g., Cargill, 173 F.3d at 334 (explaining that the functional balance requirement is “subject to a deferential standard of review”).
125. See, e.g., Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Dep’t of Interior, 26 F.3d
1103 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding an injunction where a committee tasked with
deciding whether to list a particular species of fish as endangered did not include any representatives who had an economic interest in that fish market).
126. Cargill, 173 F.3d at 336 (“In considering whether a committee is fairly
balanced in terms of function, courts naturally have looked first at the functions to be performed.”).
127. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal., 711 F.2d at 1074.
128. Cargill, 173 F.3d at 323.
129. Id. at 336–37 (emphasis omitted).
130. Id. at 337.
131. Id.
132. Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for
Foods, 708 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 1988).
133. Id. at 360.
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try-related committee members but no consumer representatives or advocates on the committee.134 The court, however,
found that because the committee was “charged with a highly
technical mandate which requires extensive scientific background as well as expertise in processing and distribution practices,” no consumer advocates were necessary to provide fair
balance for the committee’s particular function.135 Not “every
interested party or group affected” is entitled to representation,
only those required for the committee to fulfill its function.136
However, the court noted that had the committee’s purpose
been “to study the effects of a particular type of regulation of
microbiological criteria on the public, then the results might be
different.”137
When the committee is responsible for making broad substantive policy recommendations, however, much greater representation is required. For example, in National Anti-Hunger
Coalition, the committee at issue originally had the narrow
function of “apply[ing] private sector expertise to attain costeffective management in the federal government.”138 Even
though the committee only included corporate executives and
no public interest representatives, the court initially found that
it was fairly balanced given its specific function of addressing
“fiscal management of large private organizations.”139 However,
later evidence revealed that the committee, in fact, made recommendations not concerning cost-control but instead concerning broad policy issues and possible repeal of existing legislation.140 Specifically, the court was concerned because the
committee’s recommendations altered the established rights of
those who might be affected, and those people were not represented on the committee.141 Because the committee addressed
“areas of general national import,” the court found the committee unbalanced and illegal.142
134. Id. at 361–62.
135. Id. at 363.
136. Id. (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Reagan, Civ. A. No. 88186, 1988 WL 21700 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1988)).
137. Id. at 364.
138. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
139. Id.
140. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 566 F. Supp. 1515, 1516–17 (D.D.C. 1983).
141. Id. at 1517.
142. Id.
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In Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative,143 the court in determining whether two committees were fairly balanced under FACA stated that “[t]he
proper question, simply put, is whether the [committee]s perform functions that are so ‘narrow and explicit’ that fair balance among competing viewpoints is irrelevant.”144 The committees
at
issue
provided
trade
and
industrial
recommendations regarding forest products.145 These committees’ advice “affect[ed] the environment nationally and internationally.”146 The plaintiffs, environmentalist organizations,
sought representation on the committees because they had a
“direct interest in the advice given by the [committees].”147 The
court found that the committees’ functions could not “be characterized as ‘politically neutral and technocratic,’” but that the
committees “offer[ed] advice on diverse and far-reaching issues
that affect others.”148 Thus, broad representation was required
on these committees, especially representation by environmentalists, whose interests were likely to be affected.149 The court
found these committees to be unbalanced.150
In conclusion, upon examining the case law under FACA
section 5, a committee whose functions are narrow, scientific, or
technical does not require as broad representation as a committee whose functions extend to broader policy matters. A committee tasked with addressing broad policy, regulatory, and
legislative matters that affect others and are of “general national import” requires broad representation. Specifically, those
key stakeholders most likely to be affected by the committee’s
recommendations are entitled to representation on that committee.

143. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
No. C99-1165R, 1999 WL 33526001, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 1999).
144. Id. at *5.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *3.
148. Id. at *7.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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IV. THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES’ SELECTION AND
REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMITTEES
IOM committees are not only governed by statute—they
are also governed by the National Academies’ own internal policies regarding member selection, balance, conflicts of interest,
and bias.
A. SELECTION AND OPERATION OF COMMITTEES
National Academies’ staff initiates the search for committee candidates, permitting consultations and suggestions from
outside groups and authorities.151 After review, the chair of the
National Research Council, who also serves as the president of
NAS, appoints members to the committee.152 Once appointed,
members are required to “list all professional, consulting, and
financial connections, as well as to describe pertinent intellectual positions and public statements.”153 However, most of this
information remains confidential.154 Only members’ names, affiliations, and short biographies are posted online for public
comment.155 During the first committee meeting, members discuss the confidential information in a closed session.156 At this
meeting, changes to the committee’s composition are proposed
and finalized.157 Final decision-making authority regarding
committee balance and conflicts of interest rests with the chair
of the National Research Council Executive Office and the
General Counsel’s Office.158
Once committee membership is established, the committee
151. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra
note 79, at 6.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. This is a requirement under FACA. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §15(b)(1)
(2006). It is questionable whether these brief biographies really provide
enough information upon which the public can meaningfully comment because
they may omit information indicating possible conflicts of interest. It may be
more appropriate, given the statute’s spirit of disclosure, to publicly provide
committee members’ full curriculum vitaes or other detailed background and
personal information. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
156. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra
note 79, at 7.
157. Committee Appointment Process, NAT’L ACADS., http://www8.national
academies.org/cp/information.aspx?key=Committee_Appointment (last visited
Oct. 30, 2011).
158. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103,
at 8.
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holds open data-gathering meetings, which the Academies defines as “any meeting of a committee at which anyone other
than committee members or officials, agents, or employees of
the institution is present.”159 Written materials provided by
these outside individuals are made publicly accessible.160
Committees then deliberate in closed meetings when developing findings and drafting recommendations.161 The public is only provided with a brief summary of these meetings,162 and
“[a]ll analyses and drafts of the report remain confidential.”163
The report itself remains confidential until it passes through
independent review by other experts appointed by the National
Academies.164 Once the review process is complete and appropriate Academies officials have signed off on the final report,
only then is it released to the public.165 The public has no opportunity to suggest changes or address concerns—the report is
final.166
159. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra
note 79, at 12.
160. NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS, supra note 68. While NAS officially makes the data publicly accessible, the ease of this accessibility is debatable. In February 2011, both authors of this Article independently inquired
about the material available from the IOM 510(k) Committee and have received no response or information as of the date of publication.
161. Id.; NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra
note 79, at 10.
162. Use of the word “brief” may be an understatement here. FACA section
15(b)(4) requires that “brief summar[ies]” of closed meetings be made publicly
available. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(4) (2006). The summary must “identify the
committee members present, the topics discussed, materials made available to
the committee, and other such matters that the Academy determines should
be included.” Id. The IOM 510(k) committee has provided only this bare minimum information for each of its seven closed meetings, at no point including
any “other such matters.” See Nat’l Acads., Project Information, CURRENT
PROJECTS
SYS.,
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview
.aspx?key=IOM-BGH-10-05 (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (listing each committee
meeting and providing links to the summaries) (website since removed). This
minimal provision of information is not unique to IOM’s 510(k) committee.
See, e.g., Nat’l Acads., Meeting Information, CURRENT PROJECTS SYS.,
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/meetingview.aspx?MeetingID=5391&M
eetingNo=3 (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (providing a brief summary of a closed
meeting of the IOM’s Strengthening Core Elements of Regulatory Systems in
Developing Countries Committee including only the minimum required information) (website since removed).
163. NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS, supra note 68.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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B. COMMITTEE BALANCE, BIAS, AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The National Academies recognizes the importance of
achieving fair balance—not only balance in perspectives, but
balance in knowledge and expertise. “[I]f a report is to be . . .
effective . . . ,[it] must be, and must be perceived to be, not only
highly competent but also the result of a process that is fairly
balanced in terms of the knowledge, expertise, and perspectives
utilized to produce it . . . .”167 Even fully competent committees
may be ineffective if “undermined by allegations of conflict of
interest or lack of balance and objectivity.”168 Furthermore,
whether a committee is appropriately balanced depends heavily
upon the specific tasks with which that committee is charged—
“a committee that is well-balanced for one purpose may not be
appropriately constructed for a modified task.”169 Therefore, the
National Academies requires that its committees meet two criteria—they must contain an “appropriate range of expertise for
the task” and must also contain a “balance of perspectives.”170
This echoes, albeit with more detail, the “fair balance” requirements of FACA.
First, the Academies requires that its committees “include
experts with the specific expertise and experience needed to
address the study’s statement of task.”171 It is not enough that
committee members be highly qualified in terms of knowledge,
training, and experience—“[i]t is also essential that the
knowledge, experience, and perspectives of potential committee
members be thoughtfully and carefully assessed and balanced
in terms of the subtleties and complexities of the particular scientific, technical, and other issues to be addressed and the
functions to be performed by the committee.”172 “[T]he significant omission of any required discipline from the committee
might seriously compromise the quality of the committee’s
analysis and judgments, even though it is clear to all that the
committee is composed of highly qualified and distinguished

167. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103,
at 1.
168. Id.
169. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra
note 79, at 5.
170. Committee Appointment Process, NAT’L ACADS., supra note 157.
171. Id.
172. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103,
at 3.
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individuals.”173
Second, committees must have point-of-view balance, or a
“balance of perspectives.” Relevant points-of-view must be balanced “so that the committee can carry out its charge objectively and credibly.”174 Without this balance, allegations of bias
may undermine the committee’s work, regardless of its quality
or competence.175 When a committee is otherwise composed of
highly qualified experts, but is lacking balance, “the usual procedure is to add members to the committee to achieve the appropriate balance.”176
Importantly, committee members are permitted, even expected, to have a particular point-of-view on a relevant issue.177
These personal opinions, biases, or perspectives are not considered disqualifying conflicts of interest.178 Members may serve
on the committee even though they are “committed to a fixed
position on a particular issue” through public statements, publications, or by closely identifying or affiliating with particular
interest groups.179 These biases, while not necessarily disqualifying, must be balanced.
In fact, the National Academies recognizes that sometimes
member bias is actually necessary “to ensure that a committee
is fully competent.”180 Some studies require particular perspectives despite potential bias or conflicts of interest. For example,
the Academies’ official Policy on Committee Composition and
Balance and Conflicts of Interest explains that “it may be important to have an ‘industrial’ perspective or an ‘environmental’
perspective” because “such individuals, through their particular
knowledge and experience, are often vital to achieving an informed, comprehensive, and authoritative understanding and
analysis of the specific problems and potential solutions to be

173. Id.
174. Committee Appointment Process, NAT’L ACADS., supra note 157.
175. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra
note 79, at 6 (“The credibility of a report can be called into question if the
committee that produced it is perceived to be biased.”).
176. Id. at 7.
177. Committee Appointment Process, supra note 157 (“Committee members are expected to have points of view . . . .”).
178. See NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note
103, at 5.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 3.
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considered by the committee.”181 Thus, potentially biasing
backgrounds are acceptable, or even desirable, as long as they
are balanced by countervailing perspectives on the committee.
Conflicts of interest are different from points-of-view. The
Academies defines a “conflict of interest” as “any financial or
other interest which conflicts with the service of the individual
because it (1) could significantly impair the individual’s objectivity or (2) could create an unfair competitive advantage for
any person or organization.”182 Only current interests are considered conflicts, not past or possible future interests.183 Conflicts of interest are usually, but not always, financial.184 When
individuals are appointed to a committee, they undergo a rigorous conflict of interest review.185 Generally, individuals with
conflicts of interest may not serve on committees because it
could cause others to “reasonably question, and perhaps discount or dismiss, the work of the committee.”186
However, in some situations, the Academies may determine that a conflict of interest is unavoidable; in which case, it
must promptly and publicly disclose the conflict.187 For example, the conflict may be unavoidable if “the individual’s qualifications, knowledge, and experience are particularly valuable to
the work of the committee and if the institution is unable to
identify another individual with comparable qualifications,
knowledge, and experience who does not also have a conflict of
interest.”188
The National Academies states that unavoidable conflicts
only arise in “rare situations”189 or “exceptional circumstances,”190 but a brief review of past IOM committees illustrates
that this situation is not so “rare” or “exceptional.” A search on

181. Id.
182. Id. at 4.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Committee Appointment Process, NAT’L ACADS., supra note 157.
186. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103,
at 4.
187. This is required both by FACA and the National Academies’ own policies. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1) (2006); Committee Appointment Process, supra note 157.
188. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103,
at 8.
189. Committee Appointment Process, supra note 157.
190. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra
note 79, at 7.
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the IOM’s website for current or recent FDA-sponsored IOM
committees revealed ten such committees, at least half of which
contained members with industry background and at least
three committees involved disclosed conflicts of interest.191 For
example, the IOM committee on Qualification of Biomarkers
and Surrogate Endpoints in Chronic Disease includes a Vice
President at Merck & Co.192 The IOM concluded that this committee required “at least one person who has extensive current
knowledge of the pharmaceutical industry’s involvement with
efforts to define biomarker qualification strategies.”193 Thus,
despite this individual’s position at Merck, a large pharmaceutical company that engages in drug discovery and development,
his membership was desirable because of his expertise and experience.194 This committee also included another individual
who had a conflict of interest because he “owns a consulting
company through which he serves as a consultant to companies
in the diagnostic, medical instruments and pharmaceutical industries.”195 His membership was necessary because of his “expertise in clinical chemistry.”196
The IOM committee on Accelerating Rare Diseases Research and Orphan Product Development was asked to evaluate strategies “to promote research discoveries and development of orphan products to improve the health of people with
rare diseases.”197 This committee evaluated public policies and
legislative and regulatory initiatives relevant to product development for rare diseases.198 This task is strikingly similar to
the 510(k) Committee’s charge of evaluating innovation. Here,
191. See About Activities, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/Activities.aspx
?search=%22food%20and%20drug%20administration%22 (last visited Oct. 30,
2011) (Disclosures of committee member conflicts of interest are only available
for current projects, but not recently completed projects, so the total number of
recent committees involving disclosed conflicts of interest may have in fact
been greater than the three retrieved through this search.).
192. Nat’l Acads., Committee Membership Information, CURRENT PROJECTS
SYS., http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/CommitteeView.aspx?key=49028
(last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Activity: Accelerating Rare Diseases Research and Orphan Product
MED.,
http://www.iom.edu/Activities/Research/
Development,
INST.
OrphanProductResearch.aspx (last updated Jan. 25, 2011).
198. Id.
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the IOM determined that the committee must include “someone
with expertise and experience in the medical devices industry
to help the committee examine factors affecting product development decisions by companies and assess options for accelerating research and development in the area of rare conditions.”199 Therefore, the IOM included on this committee a
former Vice President of Medtronic, Inc.,200 who also owned
stock and was a consultant to Medtronic, despite his conflict of
interest.201 His conflict of interest was thus “unavoidable” precisely because his “extensive experience and expertise in product research and development in the medical device industry”
was considered necessary for the committee to accomplish its
task.202 This same committee also included an individual who
was a former Senior Vice President of Pfizer, Inc., owned stock
and stock options in Pfizer, and who was also a “partner in a
private equity firm focused on drug development programs.”203
This individual was required on the committee because of his
“expert knowledge of drug discovery and development in the
pharmaceutical industry.”204 Finally, this committee of fourteen
people included a third member with a conflict of interest, an
individual who consults with pharmaceutical, medical device,
and biologics companies, because of her “direct experience with
the administration of the FDA orphan product development
program.”205
The IOM committee on Review of the Food and Drug Administration’s Role in Ensuring Safe Food reviewed gaps in
public health protection in the farm-to-table food safety system
and made legislative, regulatory, and administrative recommendations.206 Two members of this committee had disclosed
199. COMM. ON ACCELERATING RARE DISEASES RESEARCH AND ORPHAN
PROD. DEV., INST. MED., RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS:
ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (Marilyn J. Field & Thomas F.
Boat eds. 2010) [hereinafter RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS], availa-

ble at http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/CommitteeView.aspx?key=49099
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
200. Id. at 388.Medtronic manufactures medical devices, including devices
used in treating certain rare conditions. Id. at 222.
201. Id. at 388.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Review of the Food and Drug Administration’s Role in Ensuring Safe
Food, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/Activities/Nutrition/FDARoleRev
iew.aspx (last updated Sept. 14, 2010).
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conflicts of interest. First, the Senior Vice President and Chief
Scientific and Regulatory Affairs Officer of the Grocery Manufacturers Association207 was permitted on the committee because of his “current knowledge of the regulatory and scientific
activities and perspectives of the food industry.”208 He was appointed to this committee precisely because of his “current, indepth knowledge of industry activities and perspectives.”209 The
second member was an expert in the field of risk analysis and
chemical risk assessment, who was appointed to the committee
despite his role in a consulting firm that performs risk assessments for food industry clients and “whose financial interests
could be affected by the outcome of the committee’s study.”210
Clearly, individuals with conflicts of interest are frequently
deemed valuable and necessary for IOM committees to fulfill
their functions. In fact, it is often the source of these conflicts of
interest—the individuals’ experience and connections with the
industries involved—that makes their membership on the
committee essential. Thus, these conflicts are considered “unavoidable.” At least three out of ten FDA-sponsored IOM committees contain members with such conflicts of interest. One
can hardly view that as “exceptional” or “rare.”
V. IOM’S 510(K) COMMITTEE
The IOM’s 510(k) Committee must be fairly balanced in
order to properly perform its functions. It must include all essential areas of expertise, balance the biases and perspectives
of its members, and disclose any unavoidable conflicts of interest. A failure to achieve this balance violates both FACA section 15 as well as the National Academies’ own policies and requirements.211
The 510(k) Committee was originally asked to assess two

207. The Grocery Manufacturers Association is “a trade association that
represents food, beverage and consumer products companies whose interest
might be affected by the committee recommendations.” Nat’l Acads., Committee Membership Information, CURRENT PROJECTS SYS., http://www8.national
academies.org/cp/CommitteeView.aspx?key=49032 (last visited Apr. 28, 2011)
(on file with author).
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15 (2006); Committee Appointment Process, supra
note 157.
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critical questions: 1) whether “the current 510(k) process optimally protects patients” and 2) whether it “promote[s] innovation in support of public health.”212 If the committee found that
the 510(k) system did not protect patients or promote innovation, it was asked to recommend any legislative, regulatory, or
administrative changes that would be necessary to achieve these goals.213 In January 2011, the 510(k) Committee was also referred seven specific issues to consider.214 These issues covered
a broad range of controversial issues, including the FDA’s authority to fully or partially rescind a 510(k) clearance, clarification as to when a device should no longer be available for use as
a predicate, establishment of a new Class IIb device category,
whether the FDA should consider off-label use when determining a device’s “intended use,” requiring each 510(k) submitter
to keep at least one unit of the device under review available
for the CDRH to access upon request, authorities and requirements for post-market surveillance studies, and clarification
and consolidation of the terms “indication for use” and “intended use.”215 Therefore, the committee’s composition must be balanced not only for the initial broad system-wide and policy issues, but also for the additional specific issues it was later
asked to address.216
The 510(k) Committee has twelve members, consisting of
five physicians, three lawyers, and a number of talented academics with a variety of technical backgrounds.217 Overall, the
committee includes members with a wide range of educational
and professional experiences. Each of the individuals on the
committee is highly qualified and impressive, and this Article
does not question their expertise or competence. However,
there are some critical absences on this committee. Notably,
the committee does not include:

212. Activity: Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process, INST. MED, supra note 18.
213. Id.
214. FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 6; Press Release, FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., supra note 63.
215. See FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 3, at 2, 11–13, 16–19; FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 6.
216. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra
note 79, at 5 (“[A] committee that is well-balanced for one purpose may not be
appropriately constructed for a modified task.”).
217. MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 279–
86.
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• Inventors and innovators who have created new device products
under current FDA systems;218
• product developers who have brought products from concept to
market through the FDA approval processes;
• entrepreneurs;
• venture capitalists, investment bankers, or angel investors with experience financing new medical device innovation;
• individuals who routinely prepare 510(k) applications;
management or other professionals from the medical device industry; or
• patients or patient advocates.
The FDA acknowledged some of these omissions in a recent
hearing before Congress. Dr. Jeffrey Shuren, the Director of the
FDA’s CDRH, admitted that the IOM committee does not include any innovators or inventors, entrepreneurs or investment
and venture capital experts, or patients or patient group representatives.219 The FDA later amended these answers, identify-

218. One committee member, Dr. Lazar Greenfield, is credited with inventing the Greenfield vena cava filter. See id. at 280. However, this invention was
introduced in 1973, before there was separate regulation of medical devices by
the FDA. See Ken Garber, The Clot Stopper, 22 INVENTION & TECH. MAG.,
Summer 2006, at 35, 36 (describing the invention of the Kimray-Greenfield
filter in the early 1970s and stating that “at the time, the Food and Drug Administration did not have to approve medical devices”). The Medical Device
Amendments creating the initial device regulatory system did not become law
until 1976. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat.
539 (1976). The modern 510(k) system did not start to take shape until the
Safe Medical Device Amendments of 1990. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (1990). There have been major subsequent
changes to the statutory system for medical device regulation, most notably in
1997 and 2007. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007); Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997). Of course,
there has been a constant parade of new regulations, guidance documents, and
policies in the last 20 years. See Overview of Device Regulation, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
Overview/default.htm (last updated Aug. 31, 2009) (providing information
about many of the statutes, regulations and guidance concerning medical devices). The subsequent major changes to the Greenfield filter occurred after
Boston Scientific acquired the device—and although Dr. Greenfield made suggestions to improve the filter’s design, it was Boston Scientific that navigated
the FDA’s regulatory process. Cf. Ken Garber, supra note 218, at 39 (describing the company’s subsequent changes to the filter).
219. Impact of Medical Device Regulation on Jobs and Patients: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
112th Cong. 62 (2011) (statement of Dr. Jeffrey Shuren, Director, Food & Drug
Admin. Center for Devices and Radiological Health), available at
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ing two committee members as “inventors” or “innovators.”220
However, these individuals did not contribute to the creation of
new devices under current FDA systems,221 so their contributions to this committee as “inventors” and “innovators” are severely limited and not particularly relevant.222 Without current
and relevant experiences and perspectives on the committee, it
is hardly “fairly balanced” to answer broad policy questions involving patient safety and innovation and is also not fairly balanced to adequately address the seven additional questions
posed to it.
A. THE COMMITTEE LACKS BALANCE OF EXPERTISE TO ADDRESS
SAFETY
The 510(k) Committee must include expertise to address
both safety and innovation issues. Patient safety is undoubtedly a broad, public issue involving policy and regulatory recommendations and affecting the public at large. It is a complex,
multi-factorial issue requiring consideration of not only manufacturing controls, device design, and other industry-related
factors, but also patient access, autonomy, and acceptable risk.
It is not a “narrow and explicit” function,223 nor is it “politically
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/image_uploads/
Transcript_MedDevice.pdf. The FDA later justified these absences by saying
that such individuals would have a conflict of interest and would thus be ineligible to serve on the committee; however, IOM’s past practices undermine this
justification. See Letter from Jeanne Ireland, Assistant Comm’r for Legislation, Food & Drug Admin., to Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Health, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Apr. 12, 2011) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Letter from Jeanne Ireland] (justifying the lack of these various
individuals on the committee).
220. See Letter from Jeanne Ireland, supra note 219, at 15 (identifying Dr.
Lazar Greenfield and Dr. Gary Dorfman as the committee’s only inventors and
innovators).
221. As explained above, Dr. Greenfield’s experience as an inventor or innovator predates any current FDA regulatory schemes. See supra note 218.
Dr. Dorfman, who “holds several patents related to medical devices,” may
qualify as an “inventor”; however, his most recent patent was filed in 2002,
Letter from Jeanne Ireland, supra note 219, at 15. See U.S. Patent No.
6,736,842 (filed July 24, 2002). He does not qualify as an “innovator” because
innovation requires more than mere abstract conceptualization and patentfiling. See infra notes 231–236 and accompanying text (describing innovation
as the transformation of an invention into a helpful commercial product).
222. This Article only argues that these individuals’ experience is insufficient to meet the specific requirements of this particular committee—it in no
way intends to diminish their professional qualifications, knowledge, experience, and contributions.
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neutral and technocratic.”224 Rather, the safety of all patients
in this country is an issue that most certainly affects “areas of
general national import”225 and involves “diverse and farreaching issues.”226 As previously discussed, where committees
are called upon to make policy decisions or provide regulatory
advice, broad representation is necessary.227 More diverse representation may also be necessary when the committee’s purpose is “to study the effects of a particular type of regulation . . .
on the public.”228 Therefore, following the reasoning the courts
have applied under FACA section 5, the 510(k) system’s protection of public safety is an issue requiring diverse committee
representation.
Those who invent, design, develop, manufacture, finance,
and test medical devices have much-needed expertise in how to
ensure the safety of those devices. In fact, they are legally required to design, research, test, manufacture, and support the
product in a safe manner.229 They offer valuable perspectives
on the types of research systems, manufacturing controls, testing strategies, and design processes that are needed to enhance
patient safety.230 Through their experience, they are familiar
223. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
224. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 1999).
225. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 566 F. Supp. 1515, 1517 (D.D.C. 1983).
226. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
No. C99-1165R, 1999 WL 33526001, *7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 1999).
227. Cf. Cargill, 173 F.3d at 337 (finding broad representation unnecessary
because the committee was not called upon to make policy or regulatory decisions).
228. Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for
Foods, 708 F. Supp. 359, 364 (D.D.C. 1988).
229. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d) (2006) (conditioning premarket approval
on a “showing of reasonable assurance” that the device is safe as well as an
examination of the manufacturing, processing, packing, installation methods,
facilities and controls, as well as device performance); id. § 351(a)–(d) (2006)
(defining when a device is “adulterated” and making it illegal to ship such a
device); 21 C.F.R. § 814.2 (2011) (requiring approved devices to be safe and
effective); id. § 820.1 (establishing quality system regulations to ensure that
finished devices are safe).
230. See Josh Makower, Consulting Associate Professor of Medicine, Stanford University, The Structure of the MedTech Innovation Ecosystem (June
14, 2010), in PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE
PROCESS: BALANCING PATIENT SAFETY AND INNOVATION—WORKSHOP
REPORT, 18 (2010), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Activity
%20Files/PublicHealth/510kProcess/2010-JUN-14/Presentations/14%20Mak
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with how the FDA’s regulatory process affects these factors.
These stakeholders are responsible for all new devices marketed in the United States, and it is their experience and work
that greatly affects the safety of patients throughout the nation. Yet the committee lacks this expertise. Without at least
some of these individuals on the committee, it cannot adequately evaluate the 510(k) system’s effect on patient safety and
make practical, helpful recommendations as to how to improve
it.
B. THE 510(K) COMMITTEE LACKS BALANCE OF EXPERTISE TO
ADDRESS INNOVATION
Innovation is more than just invention. Invention is simply
the embodiment of a new idea. It “generates new ideas, patents,
prototypes, designs, breakthrough experiments, and working
models.”231 Innovation, however, is the transformation of an
idea or invention into a commercial product for the betterment
of society.232 It is the identification of a need and the development of a service or product to meet that need.233 Innovation is
responsible for an invention’s acceptance in society, as well as
its profitability and value.234 Thus, innovation encompasses
more than just invention—it includes the entire cycle, from invention, research and development, manufacturing, and marketing, to the ultimate value realization in society.235 Invention

ower.pdf (explaining that good quality systems, beginning with design development and control, and continuing through manufacturing and post market
surveillance, are primarily responsible for patient safety).
231. Thomas D. Kuczmarski, Innovation Always Trumps Invention,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 19, 2011, 5:21 PM), http://www.business
week.com/innovate/content/jan2011/id20110114_286049.htm.
232. Id. (explaining that innovation “transforms these inventions into
commercial products, services, and businesses”).
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. See Larry Dignan, The Difference Between Innovation and Invention,
ZDNET (Mar. 7, 2007, 9:09 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/the-differencebetween-innovation-and-invention/4610; see also William Buxton, Innovation
vs. Invention, ROTMAN MAG., Fall 2005, at 52, 52 (“[I]nnovation is far more
about prospecting, mining, refining and adding value . . . than it is about pure
invention.”); Makower, supra note 230 (identifying the parts of the medical
technology innovation system, including “fuelers” such as venture capitalists,
investors, and public markets, “innovation catalysts” such as small start-ups,
large companies, incubators, and other inventors and entrepreneurs, “consumers” such as patients, physicians, and hospitals, and “regulators” such as FDA,
CMS, third party payers, and professional societies).
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is possible without innovation, and innovation does not necessarily require invention.236
To assess the 510(k) system’s promotion of innovation, the
committee must include more than lawyers, doctors, and academics. It must include more than inventors or patent-holders.
The IOM’s charge requires an appreciation of how regulation
impacts the complex innovation ecosystem. It requires an understanding of innovation, finance, entrepreneurship, product
development, manufacturing, and regulatory process. At least
some 510(k) Committee members must have this knowledge.
They must have experience in transforming inventions into
commercial products and bringing value to society through these new products. Ideally, the Committee should include people
who have worked within the current 510(k) framework when
they have conceptualized devices, designed and developed those
devices, obtained financing for new product lines, manufactured those devices, and successfully brought them to market.
Essentially, the committee needs entrepreneurs and those who
have recently been involved in the medical device industry for
their experience and insights into the current 510(k) system’s
effect on innovation. Unfortunately, the committee lacks this
expertise.
The FDA has even acknowledged the crucial role industry
plays in innovation. In a recent presentation made to the annual meeting of the Food and Drug Law Institute, the Director
of CDRH stated: “U.S. medical device development is an ecosystem with shared responsibilities—to remain healthy it needs a
strong device industry, a strong U.S. research system, and a
strong FDA.”237 Thus, CDRH reconfirmed and explicitly recognized the vital role of industry in medical device innovation.
This is precisely one of those situations in which it is crucial to
have an “industrial” perspective to achieve an “informed, comprehensive, and authoritative understanding and analysis of
the specific problems and potential solutions to be considered
by the committee.”238 After all, it is industry that designs, tests,
236. See Vernon W. Ruttan, Usher and Schumpeter on Invention, Innovation, and Technological Change, 73 Q.J. ECON. 596, 597 (1959) (describing the
distinction between innovation and invention).
237. Jeffrey Shuren, Dir., Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, 2011: The
State of CDRH (Apr. 6, 2011) (on file with author).
238. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103,
at 3.
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develops, and makes the regulatory submissions for essentially
all medical devices marketed in the United States.
While the current 510(k) Committee includes highly qualified, intelligent, and experienced members, individuals with
the critical expertise in innovation, manufacturing, entrepreneurship, device development, financing, and marketing are
conspicuously absent. Each current committee member is individually impressive and has expertise worthy of inclusion on
the committee, but without this broader membership, the
committee is inadequate to fulfill its mission. Thus, this committee is not fairly balanced to perform its functions and fails
to satisfy FACA section 15 as well as the National Academies’
own policies on committee composition.
C. THE 510(K) COMMITTEE LACKS BALANCE TO ADDRESS
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS
In addition to the general issues of patient safety and innovation, the IOM 510(k) Committee was also asked to address
seven specific issues, as explained above.239 Without an industry member on the committee, it is not fairly balanced to tackle
these additional questions. For example, the committee was
asked to “consider defining the scope and grounds for the exercise of the Center’s authority to fully or partially rescind a
510(k) clearance.”240 Recommendations as to rescinding 510(k)
clearances may alter the established rights of those who might
be affected241 (i.e. medical device companies who are currently
marketing products cleared through the 510(k) process), and
thus those interests must be represented on the committee.
As another example, the 510(k) Committee was also asked
to “consider the possibility of requiring each 510(k) submitter to
keep at least one unit of the device under review available for
CDRH to access upon request.”242 This has enormous practical
implications for medical device companies—storage and warehousing of functional devices such as large magnetic resonance

239. See FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 3, at 2, 11–13, 16–19; FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 6.
240. FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 6.
241. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 566 F. Supp. 1515, 1516–17 (D.D.C. 1983)
(“[T]hese three policy recommendations are substantive in character because
they affect established statutory rights of those presently eligible for various
types of ‘hunger’ benefits.”).
242. FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 7, at 6.
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imaging machines and other imaging devices, as well as complicated and sensitive electronics such as surgical robots, is not
only expensive, but requires large amounts of real estate and
the creation of specially-designed warehouses that can accommodate the specific weight, chemical, and temperature requirements of these devices.243 Device installation and calibration also presents significant burdens to industry.244 Medical
device companies have essential insight as to the practicability,
or even possibility, of this new requirement. They also offer
valuable perspectives on the benefits (or lack thereof) that such
a requirement may have in complaint investigation and corrective action for problematic devices.245 Theoretically it might be
a great idea to keep one of each device ready for inspection at
all times, but there are practical limitations that only those involved in the industry may be likely to consider.
Although this Article only discusses two of the seven additional issues, each of the seven questions posed to the 510(k)
Committee could benefit from, or even requires, the perspective
of an industry member on the committee. Therefore, even if the
committee were fairly balanced for its original functions, it is
not fairly balanced for these additional tasks.
D. THE COMMITTEE LACKS BALANCE OF PERSPECTIVES
IOM committees must also be balanced with respect to the
perspectives and biases of the committee members. While not
explicitly required by FACA,246 this is an explicit requirement
according to the National Academies’ own policies.247 As previously noted, IOM committees can include individuals with
preexisting biases, since most biases are not conflicts of interest, providing that there are countervailing viewpoints on the
committee.248 Unfortunately, the 510(k) Committee does not include a balance of viewpoints.
For instance, one committee member spent almost twenty
243. See id.
244. See FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 3, at 17.
245. See 21 C.F.R. § 820.100 (2010) (discussing corrective and preventative
action regarding medical devices).
246. But as noted earlier, this is an implicit requirement when a lack of
objectivity compromises the ability of the committee to fulfill its function.
247. See supra notes 170, 174–176 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text.
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years at the national public interest law firm Public Citizen
Litigation Group, whose motto is “Defending democracy. Resisting corporate power.”249 Public Citizen’s goal is to “defend[] democracy from corporate greed.”250 The organization is highly
critical of the 510(k) process, asserting that medical devices are
approved too quickly so that “dangerous or deadly devices enter
the market.”251 In fact, the Director of Public Citizen’s Health
Research Group criticized the FDA’s deferral to the IOM, stating that “the FDA is not being forceful enough about improving
the safety and effectiveness of new devices” and is “yield[ing]”
to innovation.252 While this individual’s participation and viewpoint is certainly appropriate on the committee, there is no apparent counterweight—the committee actually requires an explicit pro-industry viewpoint to achieve balance.
Thus, the 510(k) Committee is unbalanced with respect to
points-of-view as well as expertise. This imbalance in perspectives subjects the committee to the risk of actual bias, or at
least the perception of bias, which may undermine the committee’s hard work, regardless of the accuracy of its final report.
E. THE COMMITTEE NEEDS PATIENTS OR PATIENT ADVOCATES
It is also critical that the patient—the ultimate stakeholder—is not represented on the committee. The charge to the
committee requires balancing risk (i.e., the protection of patients) with innovation (i.e., getting patients faster and more
economical access to innovative new products). This balancing
process raises politically significant questions of patient auton-

249. PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
250. See Device Approval Process, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/dev
iceapprovalprocess (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
251. See, e.g., Jonas Zajac Hines et al., Left to Their Own Devices: Breakdowns in United States Medical Device Premarket Review, PLOS MED., July
2010, at 3–4, 6, available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/ info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000280 (harshly critiquing the 510(k)
process, and acknowledging Brian Wolfman, a current IOM committee member, for his assistance on the article); see also Device and Diagnostic Policy,
PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2505 (last visited Oct. 30,
2011) (explaining that medical devices are “often approved quickly and inappropriately,” causing “dangerous and even deadly devices [to] enter the market”).
252. Press Release, Sidney Wolfe, Dir., Pub. Citizen’s Health Research
Grp., FDA Dodges Responsibility Regarding Medical Device Approval, Defers
to IOM (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/
pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3261.
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omy, beneficence, and medical ethics.253 When should the patient have the right to some particular device despite known
risks? Under what circumstances should the FDA intervene
and make that decision for the patient by barring access to the
device? The FDA charged the 510(k) Committee with determining the “optimal” balance between these factors.254
Any adequate evaluation of patient safety requires a patient or patient advocate’s viewpoint and expertise. What constitutes an unacceptable risk or adequate safety is a valuedriven determination, varying greatly with each individual and
each disease. The stakeholder most affected by that balance
and best positioned to opine upon it is the patient. In fact, the
patient may be the only person even qualified to make this determination. Innovation concerns also require a patient’s perspective. The focus of device innovation is centered around and
driven by patient needs.255 Devices are conceptualized only after identification of a particular patient need, and only devices
that meet these needs can succeed in the market.256 Thus, the
patient perspective is critical to a complete understanding of
innovation.
But the 510(k) Committee includes no patients or patient
advocates. It is hard to justify this omission—it is easy to find a
patient representative without any financial conflict, and many
other IOM committees have included such an individual.257
253. See generally Ben A. Rich, Medical Paternalism v. Respect for Patient
Autonomy: The More Things Change the More They Remain the Same, 10
MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 87 (2006) (discussing balancing these concepts); Nili
Karako-Eyal, Physicians’ Duty of Disclosure: A Deontological and Consequential Analysis, 14 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1, 6–12 (2010) (also discussing this
balance).
254. Activity: Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process, supra note 18.
255. See Makower, supra note 230, at 31 (explaining that the focus of
MedTech innovation is “completely patient need driven, not technology driven”).
256. Id.
257. Many other IOM committees have included patient or consumer advocates. For example, the Committee on Comparative Effectiveness Research
Prioritization included a woman from the National Breast Cancer Coalition,
who herself had survived breast cancer and radiation-induced sarcoma. See
COMM. ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION & BOARD
ON HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INST. MED., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 218 (2009), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12648. The Committee on Review
of Omics-Based Tests for Predicting Patient Outcomes in Clinical Trials in-
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While the committee does include a number of physicians, they
cannot speak for the patient—the patient, not the doctor, is the
ultimate decision-maker.258 The argument that the physician
can make these decisions for the patient is long discredited.259
For example, studies have shown that physicians make different decisions when they themselves are the patient—often recommending to their patients the treatment with the greatest
chance of survival, while choosing for themselves the treatment
with the lowest complication risk.260 “[M]edical decision-making
can be a function of who the patient is as much as what the patient has.”261 Arguing that a patient representative is not capacluded a member from the Research Advocacy Network, a group “dedicated to
advancing patient-focused research,” who was also an editor of a newsletter
for patient advocates as well as a patient advocate herself. See Nat’l Acads.,
PROJECTS
SYS.,
Committee
Membership
Information,
CURRENT
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/committeeview.aspx?key=49273
(last
visited Oct. 30, 2011). The committee on Accelerating Rare Diseases Research
and Orphan Product Development included the founder of Parent Project
Muscular Dystrophy, a woman who had lost two sons to the debilitating disease. See RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS, supra note 200, at 390. The
committee on Identifying and Preventing Medication Errors included the president of the nonprofit People’s Medical Society, one of “the most influential
consumer health advocacy organizations in the United States.” See COMM. ON
IDENTIFYING AND PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS & BD. ON HEALTH CARE
SERVICES, INST. MED., PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS: QUALITY CHASM
SERIES 355 (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11623. But see COMM. ON THE
ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., INST. MED., THE FUTURE OF
DRUG SAFETY 309-18 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11750 (omitting a patient or patient advocate on the committee).
258. See Amir Halevy, Medical Futility, Patient Autonomy, and Professional Integrity: Finding the Appropriate Balance, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 261, 266
(2008) (“In both medical ethics and health law, patient autonomy has replaced
medical paternalism as the dominant decision-making model.”).
259. Judge Cardozo may have said it best when he wrote: “Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body . . . .” Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,
93 (N.Y. 1914). See also Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Compliance with Advance Directives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 133 & n.2 (2008) (“[P]hysician paternalism has been widely rejected . . . .”); Rich, supra note 253, at 92 (explaining
that “notions of beneficence and non-maleficence” are paternalistic and without justification).
260. See, e.g., Peter A. Ubel et al., Physicians Recommend Different Treatments for Patients than they Would Choose for Themselves, 171 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 630 (2011).
261. John B. McKinlay et al., Non-Medical Influences on Medical DecisionMaking, 42 SOC. SCI. & MED. 769, 769 (1996); see also Halevy, supra note 258,
at 266–67 (explaining that unlike medical paternalism, the patient autonomy
model recognizes that each patient is an individual who best “knows his values
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ble of adding to the debate over this balance is simply paternalism run amok. The patient (or patient advocate) provides a critical area of expertise and an essential perspective needed to assess both questions of safety and innovation. Without such an
individual, the committee is not fairly balanced for either function.
VI. THE FDA CANNOT LEGALLY USE THE IOM 510(K)
COMMITTEE’S REPORT
As explained above, the IOM 510(k) Committee does not
include any innovators, entrepreneurs, financiers, industry
employees, patients, or patient advocates. These perspectives
are critical for the committee to adequately evaluate the 510(k)
system’s effect on patient safety and device innovation as well
as to answer the seven additional issues it was asked to address. Without these perspectives, the committee is not “fairly
balanced” with respect to either expertise or viewpoints and,
therefore, is not in compliance with FACA.262 Since the 510(k)
Committee fails to comply with this statutory requirement, the
FDA “may not use any advice or recommendation” this committee provides.263
These omissions in committee membership are surprising,
given the IOM’s usual diligence in appointing members to
committees to ensure the requisite expertise and achieve fair
balance.264 The IOM could easily have avoided the gaps in expertise and lack of balance on this committee by including any
one of a number of qualified individuals. In fact, many such individuals already belong to the NAS or IOM, or have at least
served on other committees in the past.265 It simply defies credibility that the IOM would fail to include essential experts and
viewpoints on this particular committee when it already has
highly vetted, extremely qualified individuals among its mem-

and goals and thus is in the best position to make decisions regarding his life
and health”).
262. See 5 U.S.C app. 2 § 15(b)(1) (2006).
263. Id. § 15(a).
264. See Our Study Process, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/AboutIOM/Study-Process.aspx (last updated May 24, 2011) (“Our consensus studies
are conducted by committees carefully composed to ensure the requisite expertise . . . .”).
265. See, e.g., supra note 200 and accompanying text (describing the inclusion of a Medtronic executive on an IOM committee).
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bership. Alternatively, the IOM could have looked beyond its
membership to any one of a number of distinguished experts
and leaders in the medical device field to obtain the required
committee membership, but it did not do so.
If the IOM was concerned about conflicts of interest, it
could have simply disclosed these conflicts as it has done so
many times before with other committees.266 When committees
have evaluated drug innovation, pharmaceutical industry
members were included on the committee.267 When committees
have evaluated food safety, food industry members were on the
committee.268 When committees assessed issues involving patient safety, patients or patient advocates were on the committee.269 In those cases, the individuals with conflicts of interest
were deemed necessary to achieve balance and provide critical
expertise, so the IOM classified those conflicts as “unavoidable.” Here, however, the IOM seemingly concluded that a committee evaluating medical devices did not require anyone involved in the device industry and that this committee
evaluating patient safety did not require any patients or patient advocates. This inconsistency is both surprising and
alarming, especially coming from an institution renowned for
its thoroughness, objectivity, and balance.
Furthermore, for purposes of FACA’s fair balance requirement, it is irrelevant that the Committee solicits advice from
industry, holds open data-gathering meetings, or even encourages open dialogue with outsiders who are not on the committee. It is also irrelevant that individuals with the expertise currently lacking from the committee may have been independent
reviewers of the committee’s report before the report was issued. While this type of public input and fairness in the reviewing process is certainly desirable, and even legally required,270
it does not compensate for the committee’s failure to achieve
fair balance on the committee itself. Section 15’s “fair balance”
requirement is a specific requirement that the committee must
meet.271 Therefore, while stakeholder participation through
these other methods is necessary and valuable, it is not alone
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
text.

See supra notes 191–210 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text.
See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1)–(6) (2006).
Compare id. § 15(b)(1), with supra notes 107–111 and accompanying
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sufficient to satisfy FACA section 15.
As even the FDA has acknowledged, the IOM’s 510(k)
Committee lacks sufficient expertise and fair balance to perform its functions of assessing patient safety and promoting innovation. As it has done many times before, IOM should have
appointed qualified experts with these diverse backgrounds to
provide critical expertise and balance. The IOM’s failure to do
so has resulted in an incomplete and unbalanced committee,
which threatens the integrity of the study and fails to comply
with FACA’s requirements. The FDA is therefore statutorily
forbidden from using any advice or reports this committee offers.
VII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE A BALANCED
COMMITTEE
It is essential that the 510(k) Committee, as well as any
other government-commissioned IOM committee, is balanced,
includes all necessary expertise, and complies with FACA requirements. A failure to include appropriate membership on
IOM committees has significant implications for the FDA, IOM,
and the general public.
The FDA is responsible for regulating the production and
marketing of all foods, drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, and
many other health products in the United States.272 Its “regulations have considerable impact on the nation’s health, industries, and economy.”273 Government agencies, especially those
that play as critical a role in society as does the FDA, are expected to utilize fair, accurate, and transparent processes when
crafting rules and regulations. President Barack Obama reconfirmed this expectation through his “Open Government Initiative,”274 designed to “establish a system of transparency, public
participation, and collaboration” in government.275 Part of this

272. The Importance of Public Comment to the FDA, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143569.htm (last
updated May 1, 2009).
273. Id.
274. Open Government Initiative, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.white
house.gov/open (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
275. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Exec.
Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), in 74 Fed. Reg. 4,685 (Jan. 26, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpen
Government/.
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initiative was aimed at providing government decision-makers
with a wider array of information through public input of ideas
and expertise.276 In response, the FDA launched its own
“Transparency Initiative” in June 2009.277 “Transparency in
FDA’s activities and decision-making allows the public to better
understand the Agency’s decisions, increasing credibility and
promoting accountability.”278
If the FDA begins to use or rely heavily on information
provided by incomplete or unbalanced sources, especially when
those sources purport to be fair and balanced, its ultimate decisions may be uninformed and have undesirable effects. Members of Congress have expressed this same concern. For instance, Senator John Kerry recently wrote to the FDA
Commissioner, urging her “to establish a deliberative and
transparent process for reviewing the IOM recommendations
that ensures adequate opportunity to solicit substantive and
meaningful input from all stakeholder groups before any recommendations are finalized.”279 He was concerned that the recommendations may be “disruptive to the medical device industry and could have a chilling effect on growth, jobs, and patient
access to medical innovation.”280 A number of other members of
Congress also wrote a letter to the IOM, expressing concern regarding the lack of expertise on the 510(k) Committee, and requesting opportunities for “substantive and meaningful participation by these stakeholders.”281
Additionally, the public will also lose trust in the agency.

276. See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Office of Mgmt. & Budget to
the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m1
0-06.pdf (“Participation allows members of the public to contribute ideas and
expertise so that their government can make policies with the benefit of information that is widely dispersed in society.”).
277. FDA Transparency Initiative, FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN., http://www.fda.
gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/ TransparencyInitiative/ (last visited Oct. 30,
2011).
278. Executive Summary, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov
/AboutFDA/Transparency/PublicDisclosure/ExecutiveSummary/ (last updated
June 3, 2010).
279. Letter from Sen. John Kerry to Hon. Margaret Ann Hamburg,
Comm’r, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.thegraysheet.com/nr/FDC/SupportingDocs/gray/2011/041811_Kerr
y_IOM_letter.pdf.
280. Id.
281. Letter from Congress to David R. Challoner, Inst. of Med. (Mar. 1,
2010) (on file with author).
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An agency—such as the FDA, which has such a substantial impact on public health and on which the public heavily relies—
must use committees that are fairly balanced in order to maintain its own credibility and authority. If the FDA intends to
make major, controversial changes to the 510(k) clearance system and plans on using an IOM committee’s recommendations
when making those changes, that committee must include all
necessary expertise and foreclose any appearance of bias. Otherwise, it will be both irresponsible and illegal for the FDA to
use the IOM report, and the FDA will lose the public’s faith.
Furthermore, if the FDA is permitted to defer issues to
IOM committees that fail to comply with section 15’s requirements rather than use its own advisory committees, notice-andcomment rulemaking, or guidance development, the FDA will
be able to completely circumvent FACA and other mechanisms
for public involvement. FACA was designed to increase the
public accountability of committees that advise federal agencies.282 “What we are dealing with . . . goes to the bedrock of
Government decision making. Information is an important
commodity in this capital.”283 Section 15 was added to impose
some of these requirements, albeit a watered-down version, on
NAS committees, like the 510(k) Committee.284 Since official
advisory committees are subject to far more rigorous notification, access, monitoring, and other requirements than are IOM
committees,285 it might be tempting for the FDA to simply use
an IOM committee rather than an official federal advisory
committee. If these IOM committees are not expected to comply
with even the minimal section 15 requirements, then the FDA
will be able to use IOM committees that remain unaccountable—unaccountable to the public, the government, and even its
own institutional policies—in lieu of its own advisory committees. The result would be a governmental body receiving heavily relied-upon reports from committees that are unelected, incomplete, unanswerable to, and disconnected from the
public.286 This is exactly what FACA was intended to prevent.
282. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
283. S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 4 (1972) (quoting Sen. Lee Metcalf).
284. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
286. As a side note, it is also irresponsible for the federal government,
through the FDA, to spend taxpayer dollars on an IOM committee that contravenes federal law and that the FDA is legally prohibited from using.
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The IOM and the National Academies also have something
to lose if this unbalanced committee proceeds. Although FACA
only prohibits federal agency use of noncompliant NAS committees and does not prohibit NAS’s own formation or use of such
committees, NAS’s reputation and work quality will deteriorate
if it excludes necessary perspectives and fails to avoid actual or
perceived bias. The National Academies produces 200–300 authoritative reports each year, many of which influence policy
decisions.287 Its recommendations carry so much weight because of “[t]he reputation of the institution for objectivity, integrity, independence, and competence,” which it considers to
be “one of its most valuable assets.”288 The institution is renowned for its thorough, robust, and objective research.289 Its
members are some of the most respected and experienced professionals in their fields.290 But the value of the institution’s
work will suffer if its committees are unbalanced or lack crucial
expertise—it will no longer be regarded as objective, and possibly not even as competent.
Additionally, the IOM’s failure to comply with its own internal policies regarding conflicts of interest, balance, and bias
will irreparably damage its reputation. The IOM depends on its
policies and procedures to ensure quality, objectivity and independence. The public trusts that the IOM follows its own policies. This particular committee’s glaring failure to do so may
cast a shadow over other IOM activities as well. There is little
point in even having policies if the institution can selectively
choose to follow them or not. By releasing this report, IOM has
endangered its reputation for completeness, balance, and objectivity.
287. NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS, supra note 68, at 2.
288. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra
note 79, at 4; see also NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS, supra note 68, at 1
ACADS.,
(“Ensuring
Independent,
Objective
Advice.”);
NAT’L
http://www.nationalacademies.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (“The National
Academies—Where the Nation Turns for Independent, Expert Advice.”).
289. See Our Reputation, supra note 86 (“Over many decades, the [National
Academies] have earned a solid reputation as the nation’s premier source of
independent, expert advice on scientific, engineering, and medical issues.”);
Our Study Process, supra note 264 (“The IOM applies the National Academies’
rigorous research process, aimed at providing objective and straightforward
answers to difficult questions of national importance.”).
290. The National Academies boasts that more than three hundred of its
members are Nobel laureates and are among the world’s most distinguished
experts in their fields. See Who We Are, NAT’L ACADS., http://www.national
academies.org/about/whoweare.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
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Finally, much of what the 510(k) Committee does is secret
already—it deliberates in closed meetings, does not disclose
members’ curricula vitae or conflict-of-interest forms, and does
not make its proposed recommendations available to the public
for comment.291 “All analyses and drafts of the report remain
confidential.”292 The committee only held three meetings that
were open to the public.293 The “brief summaries” of the closed
meetings provide little, if any, useful information.294 Even the
material that is supposedly accessible to the public is not easy
to obtain.295 Therefore, it is especially important for the IOM to
comply with the few openness and balance requirements under
section 15. It is not enough to allow stakeholder participation
in other steps of the process, such as data-gathering. Nor is it
sufficient to have individuals with the required, yet missing,
expertise review the report after it is complete. The 510(k)
Committee needed members on the inside who could provide
much-needed perspectives and experience that were lacking—
and this is exactly what FACA prescribes. FACA dictates that
the committee itself includes a fair balance of expertise and
perspectives.296 Otherwise, critical expertise and viewpoints
cannot be considered in any meaningful way.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The IOM 510(k) Committee’s purpose is to assess how well
the current 510(k) process advances medical device innovation
while simultaneously assuring patient safety. Safety and innovation are unquestionably broad issues of national import, and
the IOM’s recommendations will greatly affect the public
health. Given the significance and breadth of this evaluation,
the 510(k) Committee must contain broad membership including inventors/innovators, entrepreneurs, product developers,

291. See supra notes 151–166 and accompanying text; see also Federal Advisory Committee Act, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM/StudyProcess/FACA.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (explaining when committee
processes are open to the public and when they are not).
292. Federal Advisory Committee Act, supra note 291.
293. MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 19
(listing committee meetings).
294. See supra note 162 (describing the brief summaries).
295. See supra note 160 (explaining that both authors of this Article have
inquired about available materials, receiving no response whatsoever).
296. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1)(B) (2006).
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financiers, industry professionals, and patients or patient advocates. These stakeholders can offer valuable, yet currently
missing, insights into the current 510(k) system’s effect on safety and innovation. These are also the stakeholders that will be
most greatly affected by the IOM’s recommendations and the
FDA’s subsequent actions.
Unfortunately, the 510(k) Committee does not contain all
of the required areas of expertise and perspectives, rendering it
not “fairly balanced.” The IOM could have easily avoided these
critical gaps in committee membership by appointing additional qualified experts and individuals in these areas, as it routinely has done for other committees—but it did not do so. The
actual content of the IOM report is irrelevant if the process
used to arrive at that report is flawed. Thus, the current committee fails to comply with federal law and also fails to comply
with its own internal policies regarding committee composition.
As a result, the FDA is legally prohibited from using this
IOM committee. However, we cannot unring a bell—now that
this committee has issued its final report, it will be impossible
to know whether the FDA saw it, read it, or used it. Any of the
FDA’s subsequent actions may thereafter be legally challenged
as a violation of FACA section 15. FDA may lose its credibility,
and the IOM may have irreparably damaged its reputation for
accuracy and objectivity. The IOM should have refrained from
issuing a final report from this committee until this matter
could be resolved.
The 510(k) system is responsible for clearing most of the
life-saving medical devices currently on the market. When contemplating a major overhaul of a system as significant as the
510(k) system, with the public health and entire U.S. medical
device market at stake, the FDA must rely on accurate, informed, and objective advice. It cannot be permitted to rely on
an IOM committee that is unfairly balanced and in contravention of federal law and National Academies’ policies. These concerns are not limited to only this particular committee—
expertise, fairness and balance are essential for all IOM committees that influence government decision-making. The IOM,
and the government agencies that utilize the IOM, must be
held accountable. The public deserves nothing less.

